Короткі повідомлення Brief communication
Vasyl Horoshko, Ulyana Lushch
The owner of the human body is defined in three ways: 1) religious – God is the owner of human body; 2) secular – a person owns his own body; 3) socialist – society owns human body.
Personalism interprets the human person as the integrity of body and soul. To be human is also to be with others. Martin Buber distinguishes social relationship and interhuman relationship.
Martin Heidegger defines the human as Dasein – “being-there”, being in the world under par- ticular circumstances and involved in daily activities. The core of human existence is “being-in- the-world” through our body. Yet, Dasein is only possible due to Mitdasein – being and working together with others. We are “attuned” together in the world: we interact with others, feel em- pathy and compassion. We do not feel the other’s pain but we feel it with him and we sense an urge to help him. From this perspective, organ donation is not an issue of ownership or a trade, but the “gift of life” we can offer to others or receive from them.
Короткі повідомлення Brief communication
Василь Горошко, Уляна Лущ
Власник людського тіла визначається трьома шляхами: 1) релігійний - Бог є власником люд- ського тіла; 2) світський - людина володіє власним тілом; 3) соціалістична - суспільство володіє людським тілом. Персоналізм тлумачить людську особу як цілісність тіла і душі. Бути людиною є також бути з іншими. Мартін Бубер відрізняє соціальні відносини та міжлюдські відносини.
Мартін Гайдеггер визначає людину як Дазайн - «існування тут», що означає бути у світі за певних обставин і брати участь у повсякденній діяльності. Отже, основа людського існування перебувати у світі через наше тіло. І все-таки, Дазайн можливий тільки завдяки Міддазайн
– бути і працювати разом з іншими. Ми «гармонійні» разом у світі: ми взаємодіємо з іншими, відчуваємо співпереживання та співчуття. Ми не відчуваємо біль іншого, але ми відчуваємо це з ним і ми відчуваємо бажання допомогти йому. З цієї точки зору, пожертвування органів не є питанням власності чи торгівлі, але «дару життя» ми можемо запропонувати іншим або отримати від них.
INTRODUCTION
In view of the increasing medical possibilities to intervene the human body as well as the possibilities of using body parts in research and commercial enterprises (e.g., organ transplantation from cadavers and living
donors, usage of human corpses for medical students’ practice of different procedures techniques, purchase of blood from donors, cloning human tissues in pharmaceuticals production), the human body is considered
Короткі повідомлення Brief communication
as a useful instrument and even a marketable commodity. The body (or its parts) became the property of individuals or firms. However, the use of “owner-property” language ques- tions the existential integrity of the human being and brings rupture in the identity of the human body with person’s Self [1-4].
Aim. To attempt defining the specificity of the relationship of the human being to his body and the relationship between the human be- ings in the world appealing to phenomenolog- ical and personalist perspective on the ethics of organ transplantation.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
Analysis, comparison, description, generaliza- tion, phenomenological method.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The human body is omnipresent in the con- temporary culture. It is essential for fashion industry and advertisement. It is exposed to hygienic and therapeutic care, diet and exer- cising. It underlies the cult of health and eter- nal youth. The human body became an object of consumption, possession and investment: it is considered as something that is supposed to give profit. Thus, the human body is ob- jectivated and alienated of the human Self. In this respect, Jean Baudrillard distinguished four models of body: 1) animal – as flesh, as a set of instincts and desires in religion; 2) robot – as a labour force, rationally function- ing machine in economics; 3) mannequin – a body that has value and produces sexuality;
4) corpse – as the human organism examined by medicine. Hence, the human body is inter- preted as an object of manipulation and own- ership [5-7].
The owner of the human body is defined in three ways: 1) religious – Ancient Greece and Christianity – God is the owner of human body, person is merely an administrator or a steward who disposes of the body for the good of others; 2) secular – John Locke, Immanuel Kant – body is the first private property of a person, but according to Kant, a person can- not dispose of it as of a mere object or means;
3) socialist – society owns human body, since the body is a consumer and a producer, has public and social side apart from individual and private. However, the use of ownership and profit terminology deprives the human
being of his integrity, as it puts the body apart from the person.
On the contrary, personalism interprets the human person as the subject in corporeality, as incarnated spirit, as the integrity of body and soul. What concerns the body, therefore, affects the whole person. To be human is to be rich in unicity and originality, but, at the same time, originality is an empty concept if it does not include openness toward the oth- er, cooperation with the others. Martin Buber distinguishes social relationship (I-it: busi- nesslike relation, turning around owing, using and dominating) and interhuman relationship (I-Thou: personal and true, encounter, partic- ipation in the whole of coexistence).
The similar point of view is articulated by a phenomenologist Martin Heidegger. He de- fines the human not as distinct from the world of objects, but as Dasein – “being-there”, being in the world under particular circum- stances and involved in daily activities. The world is not external to our consciousness – the world and the human being constitute the unity, since we give the meaning to the world by the way we are in the world, by actions and relationships we perform in the world due to our body. So the core of human existence is “being-in-the-world” through our body. Yet, Dasein is only possible due to Mitdasein – be- ing and working together with others, since a person is never alone in her activities and sit- uations in the world. We are “attuned” togeth- er in the world: we interact with others, feel empathy and compassion. Our body is what connects us to others. We do not feel the oth- er’s pain but we feel it with him and we sense an urge to help him [8-10].
This is the starting point for the ethics of or- gan transplantation: we face the suffering of the others and we can help them in some cas- es. From personalist and phenomenological perspective, organ donation is not the result of contract negotiation, not an issue of own- ership, not a trade, but the “gift of life” we can offer to others or receive from them, as Thomas H. Murray summarizes.
CONCLUSION
The human body is not a property, not a re- source, not a commodity. The body enables our “being-in-the-world” and “being-in-the- world-with-others”: through the body we per-
Короткі повідомлення Brief communication
form our activities in the world and interact with other people. Through attunement with the others we give meaning to our actions and fulfill ourselves. One becomes human through encountering the other-that-oneself. Gifts are important for establishing and maintaining moral relationships between people within so-
ciety and for respecting human values as they underscore our interdependence and the val- ue of solidarity and human dignity. Therefore, donorship should be regarded as gift-giving in the context of our attunement with the others.
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Richards JR. Commentary. An ethical market in human organs. Journal of medical ethics. 2003 Jun 1;29(3):139-40.
Heidegger M. Die frage nach der technik. Vorträge und aufsätze. 1954;1:13-44.
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Стаття надійшла 27.10.17
Після допрацювання 17.11.17
Підписана до друку 20.12.17